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Defense Expenditures, External Public Debt and 
Growth in Developing Countries* 
ROBERT E. LOONEY & P.C. FREDERIKSEN 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California 
This study reexamines the relationship between growth and defense spending in developing countries. It 
differs from previous studies as it recognizes differences in the borrowing capacity of each country. We 
hypothesize that a negative relationship will exist between defense and economic growth in countries 
which are financially resource constrained, and a positive relationship will exist in countries which are 
relatively resource unconstrained. A factor and discriminate analysis are used to group countries. The 
variables chosen for the factor analysis depict a country's external debt, structural condition, growth, 
and balance of payments position. Regression equations were estimated for the total sample and each 
group, with the growth in Gross Domestic Product as the dependent variable. The results confirm the 
hypothesized positive relationship between defense and growth in the unconstrained group, but was not 
confirmed for the constrained group. The results suggest the importance of variables such as foreign ex-
change, net inflows of capital, external debt, and the growth of the public sector in general, on economic 
growth. 
1. Introduction 
Common sense tells us that military prep-
arations are an economic burden. The more 
resources devoted to military preparations 
the less are available for such things as in-
vestment in technology and education - ac-
tivities which produce economic growth and 
which are the underpinnings of economic 
and social development in a wider sense 
(Huisken 1983, p. 3). Since the modem de-
fense establishment is a heavy consumer of 
technical and managerial manpower and 
foreign exchange especially in non-arms 
producing countries, one would expect the 
negative effect to be especially strong in 
these developing countries where precisely 
these resources are particularly scarce 
(Huisken 1983, p. 13). 
While military spending has risen dramat-
ically in the last ten years, Nawaz recently 
concluded that ' ... no clear agreement has 
emerged about the nature and extent of 
their economic impact' (Nawaz 1983, p. 34). 
Several studies have indicated positive net 
benefits of defense expenditures while oth-
ers have conclud.ed that the overall net ef-
•we would like to thank the editor of the JPR and three 
referees for their very valuable comments. 
feet is negative1• The main objective of this 
study is to reexamine the defense/growth is-
sue by taking into account the great differ-
ences in an individual country's interna-
tional borrowing capacity. As will be shown, 
the group of countries with high interna-
tional borrowing capacity can often avoid 
many of the negative tradeoffs imposed by 
defense expenditures. On the other hand, 
those countries possessing limited borrow-
ing capacity have experienced most of the 
negative impacts on growth associated with 
defense. 
1.1 General considerations of the defense! 
growth relationship 
One can argue that defense expenditures 
can either promote or hinder economic 
growth. Proponents of military expenditures 
justify them not only on grounds of national 
security and stability, but also on economic 
terms. As Benoit noted (1978, p. 277), ex-
penditures may contribute to growth by: 
(1) feeding, clothing, and housing a number of peo-
ple who would otherwise have to be fed, housed and 
clothed by the civilian economy ... (2) providing edu-
cation and medical care as well as vocational and 
technical training ... (3) engaging in a variety of pub-
lic works - roads, darns, river improvements, air-
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ports, communications networks, etc. - that may in 
part serve civilian uses; and (4) engaging in scientific 
and technical specialties . . . which would otherwise 
have to be performed by civilian personnel. 
In addition, the military sector is often the 
first to come in contact with modern tech-
nology and can train its personnel-in hand- . 
ling sophisticated equipment. This experi-
ence can then be transmitted to other sec-
tors of the economy. 
The basic criticism against defense expen-
ditures is that they represent a significant 
opportunity cost (see Leontief & Duchin 
1983, and United Nations 1982). Chan 
(1985) has summarized the four main nega-
tive effects. First is the modernization effect 
which was also noted by Benoit (1972). The 
result may be an income shift (as civilian 
GDP is reduced), a productivity effect as 
government expenditures exhibit 'negligible 
rates of measurable productivity increases' 
(Benoit 1972, p. 3), or a 'crowding-out' of 
civilian consumption and investment. Sec-
ond Chan suggests a balance-of-payments 
effect if growth is export-led: military ex-
penditures could lead to a ' ... chronic and se-
rious displacement of capital and talent from 
the most dynamic sectors of civilian produc-
tion to military production' (Chan 1985, p. 
417). Third, Chan notes the use of R & D 
resources in defense may hurt the country's 
technological and productivity base. A final 
criticism is that defense expenditures are of-
ten import-intensive (see Looney & Frede-
riksen 1986). If imports are financed by ex-
ternal loans, the external debt rises. If im-
ports are financed through export earnings, 
resources are absorbed which might have 
better alternative uses. Thus one can readily 
see why no consistent relationship has emer-
ged between growth and defense. 
2. Review of the literature 
The impact of military expenditures on eco-
nomic growth in developing countries has 
been studied by a number of scholars (for an 
extensive review, see Chan 1985. For an ex-
cellent survey and contribution to the em-
pirical work on the effect of defeMe in ad-
vanced countries, see Cappelen et al. 1984). 
Rothschild (1973) ranked correlated 
growth, exports and military spending for 14 
OECD countries between 1956 and 1969 
and concluded that increased defense spend-
ing tended to reduce exports and growth. 
Benoit (1973, 1978) used 1950-65 data for 44 
developing countries and estimated a model 
which included investment, defense, and 
foreign aid. He concluded that 'Contrary to 
my opinion, countries with a heavy defense 
burden generally had the most rapid rate of 
growth, and those with the lowest defense 
burdens tended to show the lowest growth 
rates' (Benoit 1978, p. 271; see also the com-
ment by Ball 1985, and the reply by Frede-
riksen & Looney 1985a). 
Dabelko & McCormick (1977) assessed 
the impact of defense spending on education 
and public health expenditures and grouped 
countries by form of the government: per-
sonalist, centrist, and polyarchic. They 
found that significant opportunity costs ex-
isted for education and health in every coun-
try, the level of development had little im-
pact on this cost, and personalist regimes 
tended to have the highest opportunity costs 
(the measurement of the opportunity cost of 
defense is particularly controversial; see 
Lyttkens & Vedovato 1984, and Dabelko & 
McCormick 1984). 
Frederiksen & Looney (1982) used a 
growth equation which also included invest-
ment and defense as independent variables 
but separated the countries into financially 
resource constrained and unconstrained 
groups. Using data for 1960-78, they con-
cluded that increased defense spending fos-
tered economic growth in the unconstrained 
group, but had little discernible effect in re-
source constrained countries. 
Lim (1983) estimated a Harrod-Domar 
type model and concluded that 'defense 
spending is detrimental to economic growth' 
in developing countries (Lim 1983, p. 379). 
He estimated regression equations for dif-
ferent regions of the world and concluded 
(Lim 1983, p. 379): 
Our results also show marked interregional differ-
ences in the relationship between defense and 
growth. Economic growth in the African and West-
ern Hemisphere LDCs in the sample seemed to be 
adversely affected by defense spending. On the other 
hand, there is no relationship between defense and 
growth in the other two groups of LDCs (Asia and 
Middle East and Southern Europe). 
No theoretical explanation was offered to 
explain why the hemisphere would affect the 
role of defense on growth. Frederiksen & 
Looney (1985b) assumed an identical model 
specification and tested for a relationship 
between defense and growth in the context 
of their resource constrained/unconstrained 
hypothesis. Once again, they found that the 
coefficient for defense spending was positive 
(and statistically significant) in the richer 
group but insignificant in the poorer group. 
Smith & Smith (1980) predicted that mili-
tary expenditures may contribute to growth 
through the direct impact on resource mobi-
lization, modernization of equipment and 
skills, the provision of necessary infrastruc-
ture, and an internal supply response to the 
military demand. Indirectly they hypoth-
esized that military spending might hurt the 
savings to output ratio. They found that mil-
itary expenditures led to a decline in savings 
relative to income which retarded growth. 
The effect on modernization and produc-
tivity was positive but weak, and they 
stressed the sensitivity of their results to mo-
del specification and estimation procedure. 
On the issue of causality, they recognized 
that military expenditures and savings could 
cause growth, but also that growth might 
prompt more defense and savings. They 
found that the small direct positive effect of 
defense was outweighed by the indirect ef-
fect of a lower savings rate. 
In a similar study, Deger & Smith (1983) 
examined the interaction of military expen-
ditures, savings and growth and found that 
military expenditures had a small positive 
effect on growth through modernization but 
a larger negative effect on savings. Taylor et 
al. (1980) e\limated a regression equation 
which relatea the growth rate of output to 
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changes in exports, population, the defense 
burden, capital inflows and capital stock. 
For all developing countries and for separate 
regional groupings, they found that in-
creases in military expenditures had a sig-
nificant negative impact on economic 
growth. Further, increases in the defense 
burden depressed the investment/GDP ratio 
which suggests that military expenditures 
are on balance competitive with investment. 
The same general conclusion was reached 
by del Pando (1980). Focusing on just five 
South American countries, he found that if 
military expenditures were to be cut back, 
the reduction in demand could be more than 
compensated by spending the same re-
sources in other sectors of the economy. The 
Faini study (Faini, Annez & Taylor 1984) in-
dicated that the growth of military expendi-
tures reduced the growth of investment and 
agricultural production. A 1 % rise in the 
military's share of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) was associated with a 23% and 18% 
drop in the shares for investment and agri-
culture in GDP, respectively. 
3. A model of growth and defense spending 
This paper extends our previous work and 
differs from other studies in several ways. 
First we specifically include several relevant 
measures of international credit availability 
(such as external debt, inflow of funds, re-
serves, and the like) in the grouping pro-
cedure since capital flows have become a 
major element in the overall resource con-
straint makeup of developing countries. Sec-
ond, we have used a factor and discriminant 
analysis to classify the countries into re-
source constrained and resource uncon-
strained groups. This reflects the multi-attri-
bute nature of each country's resource posi-
tion. Third we have included independent 
variables in the estimating equations to cap-
ture the effect of increased government bor-
rowing and debt accumulation (as well as 
defense spending) on economic growth. 
The hypothesis tested is that a negative 
relationship will exist between defense and 
growth in resource constrained countries. 
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Since government expenditures in general 
and defense expenditures in particular are 
often foreign exchange intensive, the nega-
tive relationship is hypothesized since the 
problem is zero-sum. With a high debt-ser-
vice ratio, little or no access to external 
credit - indeed a general lack of resources 
- defense is maintained or increased using 
scarce foreign exchange and other resources 
taken from alternative productive invest-
ments. Negative growth will result. For the 
unconstrained countries on the other hand 
- with a low debt-service ratio, a relatively 
easy access to international credit or a heavy 
reliance on internal funding - an overall 
positive relationship between growth and 
defense is hypothesized. In other words, the 
game is not zero-sum. Defense can be main-
tained or increased without syphoning off 
resources from more productive uses as the 
'safety valve' of external borrowing is 
tapped. 
To test the hypothesis, the following mo-
del is estimated by means of least squares 
linear regression: 
GDPGR = f (INV, DEBT, MILEXP) 
where GDPGR is the 1970-82 real growth of 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and INV is 
the proportion of investment in GDP; the 
signs of the estimated coefficients are hy-
pothesized to be positive. The debt variable 
is expressed in three different forms: exter-
nal debt in 1970 and 1982 (EXTDEBT 70 
and EXTDEBT 82, respectively) and gov-
ernment expenditures as a percentage of 
GDP for 1981 (GOVEXP). The estimated 
coefficients are hypothesized to be positive 
for the two external debt variables and nega-
tive for GOVEXP reflecting the govern-
ment diverting resources away from produc-
tive alternatives (an argument made by 
Bauer 1984). MILEXP represents defense 
spending as a percent of GDP for 1981 and 
the sign is hypothesized to be negative for 
the constrained group and positive for the 
unconstrained group. 
In past studies, causation has been an is-
sue of some concern: does a positive sign of 
MILEXP infer that defense leads to growth 
or could it mean that economic growth al-
lows countries 'to indulge themselves in the 
luxury of elaborate defense prtlgrams' (Be-
noit 1978, p. 275)? While Benoit assumed 
causation from defense to growth, one can 
easily argue the opposite. In an attempt to 
partially answer the causality question, mili-
tary spending as a percent of the budget 
(MILBUDG) is included as an independent 
variable. A priori, there is little reason to 
expect any significant correlation or system-
atic bias between GDP growth and the de-
fense share of the budget. If GDP were to 
increase one would not necessarily expect, 
for example, a reduction in the share for ed-
ucation to increase the share for defense. 
More likely, the various programs would in-
crease (or decrease) in some proportional 
manner to income changes. If a positive cor-
relation exists between the defense budget 
share and growth, we suspect it is partial 
verification of causation from military 
spending to growth. Data for this study were 
derived from the World Bank (1978, 1984), 
the International Monetary Fund (1983) and 
the World Handbook of Political and Social 
Indicators (Taylor & Jodice 1983). Military 
expenditures were taken from the US Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency (1984). 
4.0 Factor and discriminant analyses 
Thirty-three independent variables were 
chosen for the factor analysis. The variables 
were selected to depict a country's external 
debt in 1970 and 1982, its structural condi-
tion (share of public and private consump-
tion in GDP and the openness of the econ-
omy), its growth movements in the last de-
cade (growth of exports, imports, private 
and public consumption), and its balance of 
payments position.2 
Ninety-nine percent of the observed vari-
ance was accounted for by the following 
seven linear combinations or factors: 3 
1. Those facilitating public consumption 
such as gross inflow of public loans, ex-
ternal borrowing commitments and the 
resource balance. 
2. Those contributing to the absolute level 
of external debt in 1982 such as the level 
of total public debt in 1982 past inflows of 
public loans, past external debt, and the 
current account deficit. 
3. Those depicting the level of gross inter-
national reserves. 
4. Public external debt as a percent of GDP, 
1980. 
5. The growth in imports, 1970-1982. 
6. External debt service in 1982. 
7. Public external debt as a percent of GDP, 
1970. 
As can be seen, four of the seven factors 
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depict 'external debt' - the phenomenon of 
external capital flows to developing coun-
tries in the 1970s and early 1980s. Clearly, 
omitting this phenomenon would fail to cap-
ture a major influence on economic per-
formance and decision making in both de-
fense and non-defense sectors in many de-
veloping countries. 
Following the procedure adopted by 
Jones (1980), a discriminant analysis was 
performed using the seven independent 
variables with the highest loading on each of 
the seven factors. With only minor excep-
tions, there was a high probability of correct 
placement of the sample countries (see Ap-
pendix I) and a distinct grouping based on 
the external debt situation resulted. Venezu-
Table I. Mean Values of Discriminant Analysis Variables and Other Selected Government and Financing Variables 
A. Discriminant Analysis Variables 
1. Gross Inflow of Public Loans/Exports 1982 
2. External Public Debt 1982 
3. Gross International Reserves 1982 
4. External Public Debt/GDP % 1982 
5. Average Annual Growth Imports 1970-82 
6. Debt Service/Exports % 1982 
7. External Public Debt/GDP, 1970 
B. Other Selected Variables 
Growth in Public Sector Consumption 1970-82 
Public Consumption/GDP% 1982 
Private Consumption/GDP % 1982 
Government Expenditures/GDP % 1981 
Government Expenditures/GDP % 1972 
Gross Investment/GDP% 1982 
Government Surplus (deficit)/GDP % 1981 
Total Current Government Revenue/GNP % 1981 
Public Borrowing Commitments/Exports 1982 
Public Borrowing Commitments/GDP % 1982 
Debt Service Exports% 1982 
Debt Service/GDP % 1982 
Gross Inflows Public Loans/GDP 1982 
Gross Inflows Public Loans/Exports 1982 
Net Inflows Public Loans/Exports 1982 
Total Government Current Revenue/GNP % 1972 
Growth in Gross Domestic Product 1970-1982 
Growth in i_mports 1970-82 
Increase in .>ublic External Debt to GNP 1970-82 
Growth in Investment/Growth in GDP 1970-82 
Military Expenditures/GNP % 1981 
Total Military Expenditures 1981 
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statistically significant. 5 The estimated co- u (/)-
efficients of the two defense variables, MI-
LEXP and MILBUDG, are positive and 
negative, respectively, but are not statisti-
cally different from zero. In the aggregate, 
there appears to be little or no relationship 
between the level of defense spending and 
economic growth in developing countries. 
The results for the constrained group of 
countries are similar to the total sample with 
respect to the positive effect of investment 
(Eqs. 3, 4, and 5) and the negative effect of 
government expenditures (Eq. 4). The co-
efficient of the defense variable (MIL-
BUDG) is negative as hypothesized in equa-
tions 3 and 5, but only statistically significant 
in the latter at 90 percent. It would seem as 
if military spending in the constrained group 
of countries is more neutral than negative. 
This finding supports our earlier findings for 
this group of countries (see Frederiksen & 
Looney 1982, 1985). To examine the mar-
ginal contribution of foreign exchange in 
these countries, net and gross inflows of cap-
ital as a percent of exports (NETCAP 1 and 
NETCAP 2), were included as independent 
variables (Eqs. 4 and 5). The positive co-
efficients indicate a high marginal return on 
growth from available foreign exchange. 
This is not surprising given the existing rela-
tive deficiency ,of external resources experi-
enced by this group. 
The results for the relatively uncon-
strained countries indicate again the import-
ance of investment. In addition, while the 
relationship between economic growth and 
the level of debt in 1970 (EXTDEBT 70) 
was negative in all equations, by 1982 the re-
lationship was positive (EXDEBT 82), sug-
gesting that the debt accumulated in the 
1970s and 1980s had been used in high 
growth programs. Importantly, the coeffi-
cient of the defense expenditure variables 
(MILEXP in Eq. 8 and MILBUDG in Eqs. 
6, 7 and 9) is positive and statistically signifi-
cant. This result supports the hypothesis of 
the .. positive relationship between growth 
and defense in the richer countries. As 
noted above;- since there is no a priori rea-
son to suspect that growth and MILBUDG 
are correlated, the observed correlation 
lends supports to the thesis that military 
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spending induces growth rather than the 
other way around. 
It is possible that the relationship between 
all government programs (not only defense) 
and growth is positive and that the positive 
sign of the defense variables thus repre-
sented a spurious correlation. To control for 
the impact of increased public consumption 
on growth, we included the growth in public 
sector consumption between 1970 and 1982 
(PUBCONS) as an independent variable in 
equations 7 and 9. The coefficient of the de-
fense variable remained positive and signifi-
cant, thus indicating the positive role of gov-
ernment in general and defense in particular 
for this group of countries. In addition, the 
coefficient for the incremental capital-out-
put ratio (ICOR) was statistically significant 
(Eq. 9), indicating the more productive a 
capital investment, the higher the observed 
rate of growth. 
By and large, the observed R2 values and 
statistically significant variables indicate that 
the major determinants of economic growth 
vary considerably by sub-groups. The big-
gest source of growth appears to be invest-
ment for the constrained group. In the rela-
tively unconstrained group, defense and 
debt in 1982 account for only 40 percent of 
the observed variation in growth. Given the 
shortages of capital and foreign exchange 
for countries in this group, one might expect 
increases in labor to provide a high propor-
tion of the remaining sources of growth. As 
indicated in equation 9, well over 90 percent 
of the observed variation in growth can be 
explained by fluctuations in public sector 
consumption, external debt in 1982, and the 
incremental capital-output ratio (productiv-
ity of capital). 
6. Summary and conclusions 
The primary purpose of this paper has been 
to extend the discussion on the relationship 
between defense spending and economic 
growth in developing countries. Specifically 
the following hypothesis was tested: The re-
lationship should be negative in relatively 
resource constrained countries and positive 
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in relatively resource unconstrained coun-
tries. This study differs from earlier works in 
that it includes variables to depict a coun-
try's international credit position (as well as 
other resource variables) in the grouping 
procedure. The latter W(\S done by means of 
a factor analysis which reduced thirty-three 
variables to seven factors. The seven factors 
were incorporated into a discriminant analy-
sis and two distinct groups were obtained. 
Regression equations were estimated for the 
total sample, and each group separately with 
the growth in Gross Domestic Product as 
the dependent variable. Independent vari-
ables included investment, external debt, 
military spending, external capital flows, 
and the growth in public sector consump-
tion. 
With respect to military expenditures, the 
relationship with growth was statistically in-
significant for the total sample and the con-
strained group. However, for the uncon-
strained group, the results supported the hy-
pothesis of a positive linkage between 
defense and growth. Investment was found 
to be an important determinant of growth 
especially in the total sample and the con-
strained group. The effect of foreign ex-
change inflows into the constrained group 
was found to be a significant determinant on 
growth. 
In the unconstrained group, public sector 
consumption, the incremental capital-out-
put ratio, and the accumulated external debt 
all contributed to growth in this group of 
countries. Apparently, for this group, ade-
quate sources of financing in addition to 
capital inflows are available to accommo-
date increased government expenditures. 
For this group, military expenditures can be 
increased somewhat, with the net result of 
increasing growth. In other words, defense 
expenditures are not the burden to the for-
eign exchange abundant countries as they 
are to the constrained countries, since they 
can be financed out of augmented resources 
in the form of net capital inflows. However, 
given the external borrowing limits recently 
reached by a number of these countries, fur-
ther military expenditures may, in contrast 
to the patterns identified here, be under-
taken at the expense of economic growth. 
As a minimum, we would expect in the sec-
ond half of the 1980s to find a smaller num-
ber of countries in the unconstrained group 
where increases in military expenditures 
make a net contribution to economic 
growth. ·•-
NOTES 
1. The effect of defense spending is measured by the 
growth in Gross Domestic Product. We recognize 
the other effects such as the growth in inflation, em-
ployment, capacity and the like. 
2. The list of variables and the orthogonally rotated 
factor pattern (to assure that the variables are rela-
tively uncorrelated) can be obtained from the au-
thors on request. 
3. The extent of correlation between each factor and 
each variable is indicated by the coefficients of the 
linear combinations - the factor loadings. The pro-
gram used specified that at least 99% of the variance 
in the independent variables b,e accounted for by the 
factors. 
4. Table II presents a selection of many estimated 
equations. The full set of equations can be obtained 
from the authors upon request. Supplemental equa-
tions to the basic model have been included for the 
two groups to highlight the issue of causation, and 
the role of external capital flows and the growth in 
public sector consumption. 
5. The t-statistics have been omitted from Table II. 
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N = 23 
Probability 
of Correct 
Placeme11t 
57.78 
84.91 
89.07 
90.67 
68.20 
89.95 
69.08 
66.95 
51.89 
80.26 
99.69 
99.02 
76.44 
55.78 
75.69 
54.63 
60.95 
65.16 
66.09 
94.65 
81.31 
63.95 
50.81 
